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1. Introduction and Motivation 
 
The line of research that Mark Gertler and Jordi Gali and I have been 
working on for the past several  years was initially motivated by a question  and, 
later,  a realization.  The question was how to use the tool of choice in empirical 
macroeconomics, the structural VAR, to understand why some central banks (such 
as the Fed and the Bundesbank) were more successful than others  during the 
1980s and 1990s in maintaining low and stable inflation. 
  A structural VAR can be used to trace through the dynamic effects of 
shocks to monetary policy on such variables as inflation, output, and the exchange 
rate and to estimate the importance monetary policy shocks in explaining particular 
episodes in macroeconomic history.   This strategy has been employed with much 
success by Sims (1980), Bernanke and Blinder (1992), and Christiano, 
Eichenbaum Evans (1994) to study the US economy, and to study the effects of 
monetary policy on exchange rates by Eichenbaum and Evans (1994).  When 
Clarida and Gertler (1997) applied this approach to Germany, they found similar 
results.  A positive, structural shock to the policy instrument, the day-to-day          
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interest rate, resulted in a decline in production and sales, an appreciation of the 
DM,  and eventually a slowdown in inflation.   
Empirical results of this sort, while useful and interesting in themselves, are 
not particularly informative with respect to actually explaining the success of 
central banks at reducing and maintaining low and stable inflation.    To answer 
such a question,  we  realized that it is necessary to take a stand on the systematic 
component of monetary policy, and not just identify the structural  shocks to 
monetary policy (which is all that the structural VAR approach requires). The 
structural VAR restrictions provided estimates of  the contemporaneous 
relationship between surprises in the policy instrument and surprises in other 
macro variables such as inflation, production, sales, commodity prices, the US 
interest rates, and the exchange rate, thus yielding  a  central  bank  reaction 
function in surprises.   The question remained:  how to tease out of the VAR, or 
more precisely to tease out of the VAR equation for the short term interest rate, a 
parsimonious and empirically refutable interpretation of the systematic response 
of the policy instrument to all lagged as well as current  information about the 
macro variables included in the VAR.    
  One possibility is to calculate from the VAR dynamic impulse responses as 
well as  a real time historical decomposition of the policy instrument so as to 
characterize the average dynamic response of monetary policy to various macro 
shocks as well as to  estimate the relative importance of  these shocks in explaining          
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the historical behavior of short term interest rates, the presumed instrument of 
policy.   Calculations such as these yield results that are straightforward to 
interpret, at least as far as they go.  For example, the dynamics of German short 
term interest rates - the presumed policy instrument of the Bundesbank -  appeared 
during the 1980s and 1990s  to be driven by swings in the   DM/$ exchange rate, 
US interest rates, commodity prices, and the business cycle  in German output 
(Clarida-Gertler (1997)).  A weak  (strong)  DM/$ exchange rate, high (low) US 
interest rates, or surges (declines)  in commodity prices tended to be associated 
with tight (easy) German monetary policy while cyclical slumps (booms)  in   
German output tended to be associated with easy (tight) monetary policy. 
  Although these findings such as these are  suggestive of a  policy of 
“leaning against the wind”,  they  don’t  provide the parsimonious characterization 
of  VAR interest rate equation one would need to describe the systematic part of 
policy.   Moreover, the impulse responses and historical decompositions that could 
be derived from the  VAR cannot be used to   sort through some interesting 
hypotheses about central bank behavior that one might wish to examine.  For 
example, it appears from VAR evidence that central banks raise interest rates when 
output is booming, and cut rates when output is slumping.  Is this because the 
central bank seeks only to stabilize inflation  but reacts to the output   gap because 
it is a forecaster of  future inflation?          
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  To provide a parsimonious interpretation of  monetary policy that is 
consistent with the VAR evidence for Germany and other countries, we were lead 
to  hypothesize that central banks rely on a forward looking Taylor rule  
r*t  =  rr  +   π*   +  βE[πt+n -  π* | Ωt] + γE[xt|Ωt] + νt 
as a guide for setting short term interest rates (McNees (1986) hypothesized a 
forward looking Fed reaction function and used data on internal Fed forecasts to 
evaluate this model).  Here r*t is the reference (or target) level for the policy 
instrument, π* is the (assumed constant) inflation target,  xt is the output gap, νt is 
a structural shock to monetary policy, and  rr  is the (assumed  constant) 
equilibrium real interest rate.  We thought ex ante (before we ran any regressions)  
that this was a potentially attractive hypothesis.  It to us seemed able to resolve the 
dissatisfaction that we, and we suspect many  others, had with a large literature 
from the 1960s and 1970s that wrote down and estimated a wide variety of central 
bank reactions functions with little if any attempt to justify the exclusion of   
variables or to provide a  robust structural interpretation for the variables that were 
included. 
2. Forward Looking Taylor Rules and Structural VARS 
  To illustrate some key points, it will be useful to consider a simple example. 
Let  zt = [yt, πt , rt , et ] and suppose, as in Eichenbaum and Evans (1994), that the 
short term interest rate is the policy instrument, and that the exchange rate, et , is          
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ordered  last.  The structural VAR (with A lower triangular) representation is 
written 
Azt =  Bzt-1 + εt 
and the reduced form VAR 
zt  =  A
-1Bzt-1  +  ut 
The the interest rate equation in the structural VAR is given by 
rt = -A31xt  - A32π t  + B31 xt-1+ B32π t-1 +  B33 rt-1 +  B34 et-1  + ε r , t 
Now, the simplest FLRT  model can be written as 
 rt  =  βE[πt+n | Ωt] + γE[xt|Ωt] + νt 
Project  π t , n on  Ωt, where Ωt  =  [xt , πt , zt-1].   
Eπ t , n | Ωt  =  α1xt  + α2π t  +  θ1xt-1  + θ2π t-1  +  θ3rt-1 + θ4 et-1 
Substituting,  we can write rt as 
rt  =  β [α1xt + α2π t  +  θ1xt-1  + θ2π t-1  +  θ3rt-1 + θ4 et-1] + γxt + νt + ωt 
where ωt =  βE[πt+n | Ωt] -  βE[πt+n | Ωt]. 
Thus we can think of the FLTR hypothesis as placing cross-equation 
restrictions on a bivariate system comprised of  (a) a projection of realized future 
inflation on  Ωt  (b)  our forward looking Taylor rule which embodies these 
projection coefficients as well as the parameters β and γ. We note that since Ωt ⊆ 
Ωt , both νt and ωt are orthogonal to Ωt (Mishkin (1982) proposed this idea to test 
the hypothesis that only unanticipated money influences output).  It follows that 
the FLTR places overidentifying restrictions on the data.  The bivariate system          
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comprised of projecting inflation and the interest rate on Ωt  has twelve 
orthogonality conditions (since there are six instruments and two equations) but 
only eight parameters (the six coefficients in the inflation projection and the two 
FLTR parameters β and γ) so there are four overidentifying restrictions.  Note that 
in the special case in which the VAR information set corresponds to the central 
bank’s,  Ωt  =  Ωt  and we can interpret  ε r , t =  νt   as the structural shock to 
monetary policy.  However in general the composite error term  will also contain 
the difference between expected inflation conditional on the full information set 
and expected inflation conditional on the VAR information set.  The point is well 
known but is worth repeating: in general,  for the structural VAR disturbance ε r,t  
to represent a shock to monetary policy icy, we need not only to get “the order 
right” but also to get “information set right”.  This point is often made in the 
context of trying to resolve the ‘price puzzle’ evident in many VAR models by 
expanding the number of variables included so as to pick up shifts in expected 
inflation  that drive both interest rates and actual inflation higher at the same time.   
  Comparing coefficients, the FLTR places the following restrictions on an 
Eichenbaum - Evans type SVAR interest rate equation: 
      -A31  =  βα1 + γ  
-A32  =  βα2 
 B31  =  βθ1  
B32  =  βθ2          
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B33  =  βθ3 
B34  =  βθ4 
From these equations, we see the relationship between the exact identification the 
structural VAR shock ε  r, t  to monetary policy  that is achieved by assuming a 
triangular  A matrix, and the overidentification of  the monetary policy reaction 
function parameters β and γ - parameters that describe the systematic as opposed 
to the surprising part of policy -  that is achieved by  hypothesizing and testing that 
the central bank pursues a forward looking Taylor rule. Under the assumption that 
A is lower triangular (and that Ω t captures the central bank’s information set) , the 
A and B matrices are uniquely recovered  from the reduced form VAR as is the 
vector ε t of  structural disturbances.  Under the hypothesis that the central bank 
pursues a forward looking Taylor rule, the preceding system represents six 
equations in two unknowns β and γ, since the α and θ are not free but are restricted 
by  hypothesis that the central bank sets policy based upon an inflation (and 
perhaps also) output gap forecast. This is the key empirical implication of inflation 
forecast targeting (Clarida-Gali-Gertler (2000)). 
The SVAR literature can tell us about the effects of monetary policy shocks 
on the rest of the economy and on the exchange rate, but it takes no stand on 
interpreting the systematic part of monetary policy.   Moreover, unlike much of the 
SVAR literature, the FLTR hypothesis places testable restrictions on the data 
(Clarida-Gali-Gertler (2000)). One simply uses GMM to estimate the FLTR,          
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instrumenting  realized inflation and output  with lagged - and perhaps a subset of 
current - macro variables.  
  We note a basic but essential point about our approach: it does not require 
that we know the central bank’s information set.  We can still recover estimates of 
the structural parameters β and  γ without  having to assume that  Ωt =   Ωt.  By the 
law of  iterated expectations, (Eπ t , n | Ωt  - Eπ t , n | Ωt)  will be orthogonal to Ωt.   
Our theory has empirical content because it assumes, in common with the SVAR 
literature, that νt  is orthogonal to Ωt.   
  We suspect that one reason  the CGG approach has been popular is  it 
addresses, in a parsimonious, testable fashion, the “kitchen sink” problem that 
many people have with VAR models (and, it should be noted, with the early 
literature on central bank reaction functions pioneered by Dewald and Johnson 
(1963)).  VAR models (and the ‘first generation’ reaction function specifications) 
find that a collection of  n variables lagged q times can account for the dynamic 
behavior of the short term interest rate.  But why?  Since Sims’ classic paper in the 
early 1980s, economists have been aware of the danger of imposing exclusion 
restrictions on lagged endogenous variables precisely because they  are likely to 
enter the optimal decision rules of rational agents who base their actions in part on 
forecasts of future events.  The FLTR  explains the VAR interest rate equation as 
the outcome of  monetary policy  decision rule which is based on a forecast of   
target variables that  enter the central bank’s objective function (Clarida-Gali-         
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Gertler (1999; 2001).   Or as we have described in other presentations, according 
to the FLTR, ‘central banks look at everything but only to the extent that 
‘everything’ is useful in forecasting inflation and possibly output’. 
3. Are Central Banks Exchange Rate Targeters? 
  Of course, one of things that central banks look at is the exchange rate.  For 
example, the Bank of England’s  Inflation Report specifically reviews how the 
current level of the pound and the forecasted path for the pound will impact on the 
inflation forecast.   Also, as Clarida and Gertler point out, in the 1970s, 1980s, and 
1990s, the Bundesbank’s Monthly Reports  made frequent mention of why 
fluctuations in the DM exchange rate  would be factored into monetary policy, 
with a weak DM indicating possible inflationary pressures and a strong DM 
indicating a contraction in aggregate  demand.  Clarida and Gertler reported VAR 
evidence the day-to-day money rate, the instrument of Bundesbank monetary   
policy, did indeed  respond to the DM in the way the Bundesbank described.  G3 
central banks, the Bank of England, and the Bank of Canada typically do not admit 
to having a target for the exchange rate, but from the VAR evidence alone, it is 
impossible to tell. 
  The CGG approach can be used to test the hypothesis that the exchange rate  
influences the policy instrument because it is an indicator of  future inflation and 
output trends against the alternative that the exchange rate  influences the policy          
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instrument because it is a target of monetary policy.  Recall our equation for the 
simple FLTR  
rt  =  β [α1xt + α2π t  +  θ1xt-1  + θ2π t-1  +  θ3rt-1 + θ4 et-1] + γxt + νt + ωt 
where the α’s and θ’s are the coefficients from the projection of realized inflation 
on the macro instruments. This equation embodies the hypothesis that the 
exchange rate  influences the policy instrument only because it is an indicator of  
future inflation.  We have  
∂ rt /∂ et-1 =  βθ4 
The response of the interest rate to the exchange rate is the product of  the 
response of the interest rate to expected inflation and the response of  the inflation 
forecast to an exchange rate depreciation.  Consider the alternative hypothesis that 
the exchange rate, along with inflation and the output gap, is a target of monetary 
policy that directly enters the monetary policy rule   
rt  =  βE[πt+n | Ωt] + γE[xt|Ωt] +  ξ et-1  +  νt 
This  generalization to  FLTR  implies, in our example, that 
rt  =  β [α1xt + α2π t + θ1xt-1+θ2π t-1+θ3rt-1 + θ4 et-1] +γxt+ ξ et-1 + νt + ωt 
There are now FLTR parameters to estimate - β, γ, and ξ - with six instruments so 
that there are three overidentifying restrictions.  For this more general model 
(which encompasses the benchmark specification) we have 
∂ rt /∂ et-1 =  ξ  +  βθ4          
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The response of the interest rate to the exchange rate now includes the direct 
‘leaning against the wind’ channel through which the central bank adjusts the 
interest rate so that the (log) exchange rate does not wander too far away from the 
target level (here normalized to 0).  This hypothesis can be tested by computing the 
t-ratio for the estimated ξ coefficient. 
Clarida-Gali-Gertler (1998) report in Tables 1,2, and 3 that a forward 
looking Taylor rule, suitably modified to capture the interest rate smoothing 
behavior that central banks are observed to follow (Goodfriend (1991)) does a 
good job of accounting for the setting of short term nominal interest rates by the 
Bundesbank, the Bank of  Japan, and the Federal Reserve during the 1980s and 
1990s. The parameter estimates of the estimated reaction function for each G3 
central bank are quite sensible,  and in all cases indicate that these central banks 
have tended to raise nominal interest rates aggressively in response to information 
indicating a rise in expected inflation.  The estimated reaction functions also imply 
that these central banks seek to lower the real and nominal interest rates when 
output is below a simple measure capacity even when expected inflation is on 
target.  That is, for the G3 central banks, the output gap appears to be a target of 
monetary policy and not just an indicator of future inflation trends.       
Although CGG (1998) could not reject the overidentifying restrictions 
implied by the hypothesis that the G3 central banks have followed forward looking 
Taylor rules,  the paper also investigates whether or not the Bundesbank and the          
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Bank of Japan have allowed international considerations to influence the setting of  
short term interest  rates.   The papers finds that deviations from purchasing power 
parity of the nominal exchange rate with the dollar had statistically significant but 
economically small effects of the expected sign on the setting of short term interest 
rates by the Bank of  Japan and the Bundesbank. 
4. If Not Why Not?      
Thus, there is evidence that the Bundesbank and the Bank of Japan have 
historically placed at least some weight on stabilizing the exchange relative to a 
PPP path that incorporates inflation differentials (McKinnon (1995) has made this 
observation in his criticism of Japan’s monetary policy during the 1990s).  Yet 
these central banks, the Fed, the ECB, and since 1992, the Bank of England have 
been quick to reject calls that they go further and announce (and defend) formal 
target zones for their currencies, even zones with very wide (plus or minus 10%) 
bands. The theory of target zones is clear: if a zone is credible, there can be, 
especially with wide bands, a great deal of  latitude  for  countries to pursue   
monetary policies tailored to domestic macroeconomic conditions.  Moreover, this 
latitude does not, under a credible commitment to defend the zonal boundaries,  
come at the expense of stabilizing intraband exchange rate volatility relative to the 
equilibrium that would prevail in the absence of the zone.   
One explanation for the reluctance of the G3 countries to embrace exchange 
rate targeting more formally is that, even if such commitments could be made fully          
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credible, the reduction intraband exchange rate volatility that could be achieved 
would be modest given the width of the band that policymakers would accept.  
Thus, even if a band were credible,  a very wide band would do little to stabilize 
expectations and to diminish intraband exchange rate volatility.  The evidence, as 
reviewed in Clarida (2000), indicates that  the reduction in volatility that has been 
observed in actual successful target zone arrangements (i.e. the Dutch and French 
success in keeping their currencies within narrow bands of parity with the DM 
during the last dozen years of the EMS)  derives, in a significant way, from the 
dedication of monetary policy to the task  of keeping, via nonsterlized intraband 
interventions, the exchange rate near the central parity - at the expense of other 
macroeconomic objectives - and not, primarily  from stabilizing expectations. 
Clarida (2000) discusses another possible explanation for reluctance of the 
G3 countries to embrace exchange rate targeting more formally.  Suppose an 
explicit, wide band target zone when announced is not credible and that the 
markets expect ‘business as usual’.  The markets expect the same monetary 
policies that prevailed before the announcement to continue after the 
announcement of the zone.  Suppose that this expectation is, at least initially, 
rational so that these policies do continue until the exchange rate first reaches a 
zonal boundary (after all, the point of adopting a wide band is to provide central 
banks with the leeway to pursue policies that incorporate objectives in addition to 
exchange rate stability).  It is only at this date, and not before, that the markets can          
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learn anything about the credibility of the target zone commitment.  Whether or not 
they do learn anything on this date is another matter.  The monetary policy that is 
called for  to meet domestic objectives such as maintaining low but positive 
inflation and keeping output at potential  may also be consistent with reversing a 
apparent ‘misalignments’ of the exchange rate relative to the fundamentals.      
If this is the case, then as the exchange rate approaches the zonal boundary, 
the markets will learn nothing about the commitment to the target zone, and 
expectations will not be stabilized. Now at some point, the zonal boundaries will 
be approached and defending them will require that monetary policy be devoted to 
this purpose to the exclusion of  domestic objectives.   It is at this date, and only at 
this date, that the markets will learn something about the target zone commitment.  
But even after this initial observation , it may take not just one, but several, such 
observations (separated perhaps by  several years)  before the zone has full 
credibility, and before this credibility delivers the intraband  exchange rate stability 
predicted by the theory.  Thus, building up credibility for a wide band target zone 
may take longer - much longer -  than might be expected   precisely because of the 
leeway for monetary policy afforded by the choice of the wide band. 
To appreciate why  it might be difficult for the markets to disentangle 
‘status quo’ monetary policy from a commitment to a wide band target zone, 
consider again the interest rate equation from an Eichenbaum-Evans style VAR 
which would be estimated from the behavior of a central bank following a FLTR           
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rt  =  β [α1xt + α2π t  +  θ1xt-1  + θ2π t-1  +  θ3rt-1 + θ4 et-1] + γxt + νt + ωt 
Now what sort of relationship between the exchange rate and the short term 
interest rate would be expected to result from such a status quo monetary policy?  
This depends on the sign of  θ4.   Under plausible circumstances, we expect θ4 to 
be  positive, and there is support for this in the data.  This means that when a 
currency  depreciates (relative to, say,  PPP), expected inflation tends to rise.  The 
important implication of all this is that, even though if a central bank is not 
targeting  the exchange rate, the bank’s desire to stabilize the inflation forecast  
will lead it to raise nominal and real interest rates when the currency is weakening, 
and to lower  nominal and real interest rates when the currency  is strengthening .
    
This reaction, in turn, will tend to appreciate the exchange rate when it is weak and 
to weaken the exchange rate when it is strong (relative to the PPP benchmark).    
Thus, in practice,  a  monetary  policy aimed at achieving only domestic objectives  
may  also serve to stabilize the exchange rate (see Wadhwani (1999) for an 
elaboration of this point as it applies to the inflation targeting strategy of the Bank 
of England), and thus be difficult to distinguish from a policy of maintaining the 
exchange rate within  a band.            
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5. Does One Size Fit All?  
 The  FLTR  hypothesis places testable restrictions on the data (and implicitly 
on VAR models of monetary policy) and implies that a small number of 
parameters are sufficient to describe the positive economics of monetary policy.  
Clarida-Gali-Gertler (1998) go further and suggest that the parameters from an 
estimated FLTR can also be used  quantify and interpret the stresses and strains 
that can and do emerge in fixed exchange rate systems (such as the EMS), in 
monetary unions (such as EMU), and under currency boards (as are currently in 
place in Hong Kong and Argentina).  Although these systems differ in many ways, 
they share some essential features: a common monetary policy for a collection of 
countries that agree on  a common inflation target but that are subject to 
idiosyncratic shocks that can push their business cycles and inflation rates out of 
phase. Clearly countries perceive and derive substantial benefits from these 
arrangements, but such commitments can also entail costs.  Among these costs are 
(1) the inability to lower interest rates (real and nominal) when the home country is 
recession and to be forced to rely entirely on a gradual gain in competitiveness to 
restore internal balance; and (2) the inability to raise interest rates (real and 
nominal) when home country inflation surges above the common inflation target 
and to be forced to rely entirely on a loss of competitiveness to restore internal 
balance.          
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CGG propose that these costs can be quantified in the following way. 
Compute for each country in the monetary arrangement a (counterfactual) Taylor 
rule path for the domestic short term interest rate based upon that country’s 
expected inflation and output gap and the estimated (or assumed) Taylor rule 
weights for the central bank that is setting monetary policy for the group. This 
counterfactual path for the nominal interest rate does not necessarily represent an 
alternative for monetary policy that is actually available to the country, given its 
objectives for inflation, output, and the exchange rate.  Rather, the counterfactual 
path can be compared to the realized path of interest rates in each  country to 
quantity the costs that are incurred by the commitment to a monetary regime that 
ties the hands of domestic monetary policy.  
In Clarida-Gali-Gertler (1998), this approach was used to study the collapse 
of the EMS in 1992 - 1993.  For France and Italy, CGG found a positive gap 
between French and Italian interest rates and their counterfactual Taylor rule 
counterparts that widened steadily and substantially throughout 1991-1992, 
resulting in Italian interest  rates that were 1000 basis points higher than their 
counterfactual Taylor rule counterpart in September 1992 (when Italy withdrew 
from the ERM) and French interest rates that were 800 basis points higher than 
their Taylor rule counterpart  on the eve of the August 1993 ‘re-design’ of the 
ERM (see Buiter-Corsetti-Pessenti (1996) for all the details).   For Britain,  when it 
entered the ERM in October 1990,  interest rates were in line with the Taylor rule          
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“counterfactual”.  As was the case for France and Italy,  a positive gap between the 
British interest rate and the counterfactual Taylor rule counterpart began to emerge 
and widened steadily and substantially throughout 1991-1992, resulting in  British 
interest  rates that were nearly 400 basis points higher  than their counterfactual 
Taylor rule counterpart in September 1992  (when Britain chose to drop out of the 
ERM and adopt inflation targeting).  Thus, during the last years of the ERM, the 
costs of the ‘one size fits all’ monetary policy of the Bundesbank for the other 
countries in the system was estimated to be substantial, ranging from 400 basis 
points in Britain to 1000 basis points in Italy.  CGG refer to this difference 
between actual interest rate in country j and the counterfactual  FLTR  interest rate 
as a  stress indicator. 
stress j , t   =  r j , t  -  βE[π j ,t+n | Ωt]  -  γE[x j, t|Ωt]   
  The motivation for defining stress in this way derives from the rationale that 
policymakers themselves often use, after the fact, to explain their unwillingness to 
hang on to an exchange rate arrangement that ties the hands of monetary policy 
during an economic downturn.  Here is a quote from the Bank of England in 
November 1992 
Against a backdrop of sluggish activity and stable or falling 
inflation, a number of countries in Europe have experienced a 
growing conflict between the monetary policy required to 
maintain the exchange rate, and the policy that would be 
appropriate given domestic cyclical conditions.  In a number of 
cases, nominal interest rates might have been lower but  for the 
ERM.  This was particularly the case for those countries  which 
were  . . in a different cyclical position.            
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 The CGG stress indicator is a simple to compute - and easy to understand - way to 
gauge how much different interest rates might be but for  been but for a binding  a 
commitment to an exchange rate arrangement, monetary union, or currency board.   
Stress  can be decomposed in an interesting way.  It is the sum of three 
terms:  ( i ) stress in the policy of the central bank setting interest rates for the 
group (e.g., the Bundesbank in the case of the EMS, the ECB in the case of EMU, 
and the US in the case of Hong Kong and Argentina); (ii) an index (using Taylor 
Rule weights) of the divergence between inflation and output  across countries (i.e. 
between the EMU country under study and EMU wide averages); (iii) and the 
interest differential between the country under study and the interest rate set by the 
central bank running monetary policy for the group ( a measure of the credibility of 
the commitment to the regime).  In symbols we have 
stress j , c , t ≡  stress c , t+ [β(π c , t - π j , t) + γ(x c , t - x j , t)]  + R j  , t  -  R c , t  
According to this decomposition, the cost of forgoing an independent monetary 
policy increases with the divergence between home and average inflation rates and  
output gaps, the interest differential, and the stance  of monetary policy (relative to 
the Taylor  rule benchmark) by the central bank running monetary policy for the 
group.         
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Conclusion 
This paper has used the empirical framework developed in Clarida ,Gali, 
Gertler (1998; 1999; 2000) and Clarida (2000) to assess what we know , don’t 
know, and can’t tell about monetary policy making in an open economy with an 
(implicit) inflation target.  We have shown how our approach can be used to   
interpret structural VAR models of monetary policy and exchange rates and have 
provided a novel explanation for why central bankers who currently set policy 
based on  inflation forecast might be averse to even wide - band target zones.  
Finally, we suggest a way to quantify and decompose the stresses and  costs of a 
one size fits all monetary policy for the members of a monetary union or currency 
bloc.     
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